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Abstract
This paper documents a marked increase in international consumption risk
sharing throughout the recent globalization period. Unlike earlier studies
that have found it diﬃcult to document a consistent eﬀect of financial glob-
alization on international consumption comovements, we make use of the
information implicit in the relative levels of consumption and output to mea-
sure long-run risk sharing among OECD countries and US federal states. We
derive our empirical setup from a deliberately simplistic model in which coun-
tries can trade perpetual claims to each other’s output (Shiller securities).
This model allows us to identify the channels through which improvements
in international risk sharing have come about. The model predicts cross-
country and cross-regional income flows with considerable precision. Both
international income flows as well as consumption risk sharing have increased
since 1990, in line with the gradual removal of country portfolio home bias
documented elsewhere. Still, the increase in international income flows falls
short of explaining all of the consumption risk sharing we see in international
data. We show that heterogeneity in countries’ gross foreign asset positions
is important in explaining this result. While countries with less portfolio
home bias enjoy better consumption risk sharing, our findings also suggest
that heterogeneity in country portfolios opens an separate channel for con-
sumption risk sharing, possibly through asymmetric valuation eﬀects that
have been emphasized in the recent literature.
Keywords: Consumption Risk Sharing, International and regional busi-
ness cycles, Capital flows, Home Bias, Non-stationary panel data
JEL classification: C23, E21, F36
1 Introduction
Financial market integration should lead to better international consump-
tion risk sharing. Most of the extant literature on international risk sharing
has, however, found it diﬃcult to document a consistent eﬀect of financial
globalization on consumption.1 Our first objective in this paper is to provide
evidence that consumption risk sharing among OECD countries has indeed
increased considerably during the recent globalization period, i.e. since 1980
but in particular after 1990. Our second objective is to investigate to what
extent improvements in international consumption risk sharing have been
associated with increases in international factor income flows and whether
these improvements can eventually be linked to the dramatic increase in in-
ternational cross-holdings of financial assets that has been documented in
the recent literature.
In line with most of the empirical consumption risk sharing literature
we base our empirical analysis on a key implication of complete financial
markets: fluctuations in relative (i.e. idiosyncratic) marginal utility growth
should be independent of idiosyncratic risk (as measured by relative output
growth rates). Therefore, the coeﬃcient of a regression of relative consump-
tion growth on relative output growth should be zero.2 If financial markets
are incomplete, the size of this coeﬃcient can be directly interpreted as a
measure of the deviation from the complete markets outcome. Most of the
empirical literature has estimated such risk sharing regressions based on data
that has been rendered stationary through first diﬀerencing. One novelty of
our approach is to use the information implicit in the levels of relative con-
sumption and output by running (panel) risk sharing regressions in relative
log levels rather than relative growth rates. The advantage of the level spec-
ification is that it enables us to pick up longer-term trends in consumption
risk sharing that seem to remain blurred in the specifications that have so far
been used in the literature. Based on such a level specification, we document
that consumption risk sharing has indeed increased since 1990.
We motivate our econometric approach from a simple model that allows
us to interpret the coeﬃcient in the risk sharing regression as the share of
the average country’s or region’s wealth held in claims to domestic output —
the coeﬃcient is a measure of portfolio ‘home bias’. Our framework, while
consistent with virtually all theoretical models of consumption behaviour, is
suﬃciently simple to allow us to address the second objective of this paper:
1In Artis and Hoﬀmann (2004) we explore why this is the case
2Similar regressions were first proposed by Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991) and Townsend
(1991) as tests of the null of market completeness. In the macroeconomic literature, they
were popularized by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Crucini (1999) and others.
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once we have estimated the degree of home bias based on consumption and
output data, we can use the model to generate income data (defined as output
plus net capital income flows) that we then compare to real-world GNP and
state level income data.
Our empirical analysis is based on two data sets: the first is an interna-
tional (OECD) data set and ranges from 1960 to 2000, whereas the second
is the data set for U.S. federal states employed in the seminal paper by As-
drubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996). This data set ranges from 1960-90. Our
findings can be summarized as follows:
The lack of international consumption risk sharing that is so widely doc-
umented in the literature is considerably less pronounced in what we refer
to as the globalization period, i.e. after 1990. We also provide evidence that
these improvements in international consumption risk sharing are associated
with increases in international capital income flows.
From the literature inspired by the seminal papers by Asdrubali, Sørensen
and Yosha (1996) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998) we know that capital
income flows derived from cross-holdings of claims to productive capital are a
much more important channel of risk sharing among regions or federal states
than among countries. Indeed, the fact that this channel is virtually absent
in international data can account for almost all of the lack of consumption
risk sharing at the international level. In this paper, we use our simple
model — estimated from consumption and output data alone — to predict
income flows. In spite of its simplicity, our model matches the pattern of
income flows between U.S. federal states very well. For the globalization
period, the model also predicts increases in international income flows that
are in line with those observed in the data. But in international data, the
degree of consumption risk sharing estimated from the model over the entire
sample period remains hard to reconcile with the still very limited degree of
international capital income flows.
As a solution to this puzzle, we explore the role of heterogeneity in coun-
try portfolios: first, the very notion of portfolio home bias implies that coun-
tries’ asset portfolios are very heterogenous. But even as portfolio home
bias is decreasing, important diﬀerences in the size and composition of coun-
try portfolios persist. This point is prominently documented in Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2003). Secondly, if country portfolios are very diﬀerent, fluc-
tuations in asset prices can induce asymmetric wealth eﬀects across countries
and these wealth eﬀects may serve as a hedge against idiosyncratic fluctua-
tions in output. Indeed, we find that accounting for some heterogeneity in
country portfolios goes a long way in explaining why income flows are less
important as a channel of risk sharing among countries than among regions
and why accounting for international capital income flows alone will tend to
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underestimate the eﬀective degree of international consumption risk sharing.
Recent contributions to which our paper is related are Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti(2001, 2003), Gourinchas and Rey (2004)and Sørensen , Yosha, Wu
and Zu (2004). Lane andMilesi-Ferretti document the virtual explosion in in-
ternational asset cross-holdings during the 1990s along with the persistence of
considerable heterogeneity in country portfolio holdings and returns. Gour-
inchas and Rey use a log-linearized intertemporal budget constraint to show
that the U.S. current account forecasts exchange rate changes and changes
in relative stock market valuations rather than future current account sur-
pluses. Therefore, price adjustments rather than capital flows seem to restore
intertemporal budget balance for the United States. Our paper is perhaps
most closely related to Sørensen et al. (2004) who show that countries with
higher shares of foreign assets in their net wealth tend to enjoy better income
smoothing through higher international factor income flows. Therefore, the
equity home bias and the lack of international consumption risk sharing ap-
pear as ’twin puzzles separated at birth’. Our theoretical framework captures
this idea.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in the next section
we introduce our theoretical framework and use it to motivate the level risk
sharing regression. In section three we present our data and obtain the
country portfolio weights by estimating our levels risk sharing regressions. In
section four we relate the estimated portfolio weights to international income
flows and we explore the role of portfolio heterogeneity at the international
level. Section five summarizes and concludes.
2 Income flows and consumption risk shar-
ing: an integrated framework
This section presents a general framework that allows us to study the link
between consumption risk sharing and net capital income flows. In the first
instance, we will use this framework to motivate an alternative way of mea-
suring consumption risk sharing: our approach is based on panel regressions
of relative log-levels of consumption on relative log levels of output. As we
will argue, this approach is more likely to pick up the eﬀects of financial glob-
alization over time than are conventional approaches that have either used
consumption correlations or regressions of consumption growth on output
growth.
In a second step, we then ask if the pattern of interregional and inter-
national capital income flows is consistent with the predictions of the model
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and with the degree of international risk sharing that we have estimated.
Our framework nests virtually all current theories of consumption: the
only assumption we make is that each period the representative inhabitant
of country or region k consumes a fraction µkt of her income
Ckt = µ
k
t INC
k
t (1)
where C and INC denote per capita values of consumption and income.
For example, this formulation is consistent with permanent income models,
where µkt captures the eﬀect of discounting and uncertainty on consumption,
given today’s income. We will discuss the interpretation of µkt in more detail
below.
Now recall the definition of income from the national accounts: a coun-
try’s income equals its output plus net claims to output produced in the rest
of the world.
INCkt = Y
k
t +NFI
k
t
where NFIkt is net factor income from abroad, i.e. the country’s net
claims on flows of foreign output.
Recent work by Sørensen et al. (2004) demonstrates that the degree
to which net factor income flows contribute to smoothing national income
varies positively with the share of foreign assets in country wealth. They
argue that the lack of international consumption risk sharing and the equity
home bias are ‘twin puzzles separated at birth’. We formalize this idea in our
framework here that builds on Crucini (1999). In order to link international
income flows to the structure of countries’ asset portfolios in a tractable
manner, we assume that countries trade perpetual claims to their respective
output streams. Such assets have first been suggested by Shiller (1993) and
we therefore refer to them as Shiller-securities. Each country allocates its
wealth into either a claim to domestic assets or into a world mutual fund of
foreign Shiller securities. Since income constitutes the dividend from wealth,
per capita incomemust be the weighted average of dividends paid on domestic
and foreign assets. The dividends of Shiller securities are just foreign and
domestic output, so that per capita income in country k is
INCkt = λY
∗
t + (1− λ)Y kt (2)
where λ is the (ex ante value weighted) share of foreign assets in the country’s
wealth portfolio. Here, Y kt denotes country k per capita output and Y
∗
t is
the average of per capita outputs across all countries. Note that under these
assumptions, net factor income flows are given by
NFIkt = Y
k
t − INCkt = λ(Y ∗t − Y kt )
4
which captures the idea that countries with higher portfolio shares of foreign
assets will achieve more risk sharing through income smoothing, as discussed
by Sørensen et al. (2004).3
Perpetual claims to a country’s entire output are not currently traded in
world financial markets. But while our model is very stylized, we note that
it is also quite general because existing assets — in particular equity — may at
least in part allow countries and regions to replicate the pay-oﬀ structure of a
portfolio of Shiller securities. Clearly, in frictionless markets, countries would
want to diversify completely, which amounts to selling their national output
to the world mutual fund. Hence, under complete diversification, we will have
λ = 1. But claims to a country’s entire output would also comprise claims
to labour income and other non-tradeable output components. Furthermore,
we will expect that frictions in financial and goods markets will drive λ away
from unity. The parameter λ is therefore a metric of how close observed
income flows are to the income flows we would observe if countries or regions
could completely diversify any idiosyncratic risk by investing all their wealth
into a world portfolio of Shiller securities. We think of λ as the eﬀective degree
of diversification of the average country and we refer to it as the ‘Shiller
portfolio weight’ or as ‘home bias’: the parameter λ tells us, what share of
a country’s income is eﬀectively derived from home and foreign sources and
we turn to estimating λ from the data. Plugging into (1), we obtain
Ckt = µ
k
t INC
k
t = µ
k
t
£
λY ∗t + (1− λ)Y kt
¤
(3)
Note that this implies that countries will generally be able to decouple in-
come and consumption through savings and dissavings. We can think of µkt
as capturing an array of country-specific eﬀects such as the rates of return
on the country’s or region’s wealth. For example, in the context of the per-
manent income hypothesis (PIH), consumption should equal the permanent
component of income defined as
INCkPt =
rk
1 + rk
Et
( ∞X
l=0
·
1
1 + rk
¸l £
INCkt+l
¤)
where rk is the country’s real interest rate andEt is the expectations operator.
Then, according to the PIH, Ckt = INC
kP
t . Assume for expository purposes
that income follows a stationary AR(1) with autoregressive coeﬃcient ρ,
0 < ρ < 1. Then
Ckt =
rk
1 + rk − ρ
INCkt (4)
3We start by assuming that λ is the same across countries. We explore the implications
of variation in λ across countries and over time below.
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so that in this simple case, µkt = rk (1 + rk − ρ)
−1 is a country-specific con-
stant reflecting the country’s return on wealth and the persistence of its
income process. Clearly, we could also let r vary over time, so that we could
think of variation in µkt as reflecting time-variation in expected rate of returns
on country wealth.
In the next subsection, we are now going to use equation (3) to develop
a simple estimation equation for the portfolio weights λ that is based on
consumption and output data alone. The road map for the empirical part
of the paper is then as follows: we first estimate values of λ. We then use
these values to generate artificial income data according to (2) above. The
properties of these artificial income data are then compared to actual GNP
and personal state income data along diﬀerent dimensions. Finally, we also
also explore the impact of international diﬀerences in foreign asset positions
on the size and volatility of international income flows.
2.1 A risk sharing regression in levels
We first re-write equation (3) by dividing by world income. For the link
between world consumption and world income, we make an analogous as-
sumption as for the home country, so that C∗t = µ
∗
t INC
∗
t . Then using that
world per capita income is world per capita output, we obtain:
Ckt
C∗t
=
µkt
µ∗t
·
λ+ (1− λ)Y
k
t
Y ∗t
¸
(5)
Equation (5) will not let us estimate 1−λ directly from a linear regression.
We therefore base our estimation on a log-linear specification of (5). In
addition, this oﬀers the advantage that it is in keeping with most of the
risk sharing regressions in the literature that are also largely based on log-
linear specifications and keeping with this tradition facilitates highlighting
parallels and diﬀerences in our approach. Secondly, specifications involving
logarithmic levels rather than levels of macroeconomic variables are generally
known to have normal residuals and would therefore — a priori — appear more
robust.
We now make explicit the assumptions we make in log-linearizing (5). We
apply logarithms on both sides of (5). Denoting φkt = log µ
k
t − log µ∗t , we get
log
µ
Ckt
C∗t
¶
= φkt + log
·
λ+ (1− λ)Y
k
t
Y ∗t
¸
(6)
Next, we expand the logarithmic term on the right hand side around Y
kP
t
Y ∗Pt
= 1.
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This yields
log
·
λ+ (1− λ)Y
kP
t
Y ∗Pt
¸
≈ log [λ+ (1− λ)] + (1− λ)
λ+ (1− λ)
·
Y kt
Y ∗t
− 1
¸
= (1− λ)
·
Y kt − Y ∗t
Y ∗t
¸
Finally, approximating
log
µ
Y kt
Y ∗t
¶
≈ Y
k
t − Y ∗t
Y ∗t
and plugging back into the previous equation, we obtain the levels risk sharing
regression that is the focus of the empirical analysis in this paper:
log
µ
Ckt
C∗t
¶
= φkt + (1− λk) log
µ
Y kt
Y ∗t
¶
(7)
Having lower-case letters denote logarithms, we can write
ckt − c∗t = (1− λ)
£
ykt − y∗t
¤
+ φkt (8)
This equation is reminiscent of the equations estimated in Mace (1991),
Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Cochrane (1991) or Crucini (1999).
It relates relative consumption to relative output. Under full risk sharing,
the coeﬃcient on relative (permanent) output should be zero. The decisive
diﬀerence vis-à-vis the earlier literature is that equation (8) relates relative
log-levels whereas earlier implementations were formulated in diﬀerences.
In our derivation, we have assumed λ to be the same across countries and
in our empirical analysis we estimate (8) as a non-stationary panel relation
in the sense of Phillips and Moon (1999). This will allow us to estimate
the degree of home bias — (1− λ) — for the average country. Note that this
setup, while quite similar in spirit to the literature that has estimated such
regressions in first diﬀerences, estimating a non-stationary panel relation such
as (8) allows for a high degree of unobserved heterogeneity across regions and
countries through the time-varying, country-specific term φkt .
4 As we have
discussed, φkt can account for diﬀerences in discount rates across countries, for
international diﬀerences in the persistence of a country’s or region’s output,
wealth eﬀects from changes in a country’s relative asset position and so forth.
Note that (8) defines a cointegrating relationship if φkt is stationary. But this
4In our empirical implementation, we decompose φkt = φk + ukt , where φk is a country-
specific fixed eﬀect and ukt is a residual. Clearly, besides φk additional deterministic but
time varying country-specific terms (such as linear trends) could also be considered.
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is not an assumption we wish to make. The country-specific term φkt could
even be non-stationary, still a well-defined long-run panel relation between
consumption and output in the sense of Phillips and Moon(1999) can exist
and can be estimated using standard methods. We discuss this issue below.
As our results will show, the coeﬃcient from the levels regression has been
declining since 1990 at the latest, suggesting that the international diversi-
fication of consumption risk has indeed increased. In Artis and Hoﬀmann
(2004) we have explored explanations for why risk sharing regressions for-
mulated in first diﬀerences have not generally detected this increase in risk
sharing: if consumption is forward-looking as for example in a permanent
income model and if risk sharing is incomplete, so that home output has
some impact on home consumption, then expected future changes in output
will influence current consumption decisions. Consider two countries, one in
which (relative) output shocks are i.i.d. and one in which they are positively
autocorrelated. Suppose both countries are diversified so that λ = 1/2. Then
a positive shock in (relative) output today will lead to a one half percent-
age point increase in consumption in the country in which output shocks is
i.i.d. But in the country where the shock is serially correlated, consump-
tion will react more strongly because high output today forebodes higher
output tomorrow and consumption reacts to the permanent level of output.
In a regression that is based on first diﬀerences, the country with the se-
rially correlated output shock will therefore have a coeﬃcient higher than
1/2, suggesting that the country shares less risk than the country with i.i.d.
shocks. In our non-stationary setting here, diﬀerences in the persistence of
country-specific shocks will only aﬀect φkt , though, and not the estimate of
the diversification measure λ. In an analogous way, the non-stationary risk
sharing regression that we advocate in this paper is likely to be more robust
to changes over time in the structure of countries’ or regions’ business cycles.
Again, such changes will find their reflection in time variation in φkt ,but not
in the estimate of λ, while these very changes may blur — and can possi-
bly oﬀset —the eﬀect of globalization on the coeﬃcient in more traditional,
diﬀerenced risk sharing regressions.
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Data
We apply our approach to two data sets: one for U.S. states and one for a
group of 23 OECD countries. All data are annual.
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The US-data set is the one also used by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha5
and is based on gross-state product and income data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). Since consumption data at the state level are not
available, it is common practice6 to use retail sales data by state. These retail
sales data are re-scaled by the share of retail sales in aggregate (US-wide)
consumption to obtain measures of state level consumption data. All data
are deflated by the US-wide consumption price index. The US-data range
from 1960 to 1990.
Country-level data are from the Penn World Table, release 6.1 (PWT
6.1.) by Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) and range from 1960 to 2000.
All data are in constant (1996) international prices. The countries included
in our estimation are:
1. Canada, 2. the United States, 3. Japan, 4. Austria, 5. Belgium,
6. Denmark , 7. Finland, 8. France, 9. Germany (West), 10. Greece, 11.
Iceland, 12. Ireland, 13. Italy, 14. Luxemburg, 15. Netherlands, 16. Norway,
17. Portugal, 18. Spain, 19. Sweden, 20. Switzerland, 21. United Kingdom,
22. Australia, 23. New Zealand.
Most of these countries are OECD countries and we will refer to them
under this label. As regards the US, we follow the general practice in the US
regional business cycle literature and include all states except Washington
D.C.
We express all data in per capita terms. Rest of the World (RoW) aggre-
gates are the US- or OECD-wide average per capita values. Population data
are from the BEA and PWT respectively.
Over the sample period covered by our international data set, interna-
tional financial markets have become increasingly liberalized. To take ac-
count of this change, we will report results obtained for two subperiods: the
first covers the period 1960-1990, the second covers 1990-2000. The results
we obtain from the first sub period can be compared directly to others in
the literature (the studies by Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and Crucini (1999)
cover the same period), while the results from the second sub period should
provide insights into the eﬀects of the dramatic increase in net international
asset positions that took place in particular in the 1990s (compare e.g. the
data in Lane (2000), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and Kraay, Loayza,
Serven and Ventura (2001)).
5The data base is available at Oved Yosha’s web page
http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/riskshare/channels/channels.htm
6Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Hess and Shin (1998) and DelNegro(2002) all
follow this approach.
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3.2 Estimating portfolio shares
We now turn to estimating the Shiller portfolio weights based on the level
risk sharing regression (8). This regression (8) constitutes a long-run panel
relation in the sense of Phillips and Moon (1999) and can, in principle, be
estimated consistently by OLS. However, OLS may suﬀer from second-order
bias due to potential simultaneity and due to serial correlation of the errors.
Phillips and Moon (1999) therefore advocate a panel version of the fully mod-
ified least squares method. Since, the FM-OLS estimator is semiparametric,
it may, however, be imperfectly suited for relatively small samples. Kao and
Chang (1999) have shown that the panel dynamic OLS estimator suggested
by Mark and Sul (2002) may be preferable in this case. Also, Mark and
Sul (2002) have forcefully argued for the dynamic panel OLS estimator on
grounds of its simplicity. We therefore conducted all our analyses based on
the panel OLS and the panel dynamic OLS estimator.
The panel dynamic OLS estimator accounts for serial correlation and
potential simultaneity by including leads and lags of the diﬀerences of the
RHS variables. We experimented with various leads and lags, but found our
results to be very consistent across specifications. All results were also very
similar to those obtained from plain OLS estimates. The parameter estimates
in table 2 are based on the panel dynamic OLS procedure with one lead and
lag which is suﬃcient to capture serial dependence in annual data.
The PDOLS procedure is robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity in
the errors of the individual units of the panel. In fact, cross-sectional het-
erogeneity in the short-run dynamics and the disturbance terms purges the
limiting distribution of the PDOLS estimator of nuisance parameters and
reduces the asymptotic variance of the parameter estimates (see Kao and
Chian (1999)). Some of the PDOLS estimates of (1− λ) in table (2) would
appear to be only marginally significant in international data. However, the
reported standard errors are conservative since they do not allow for cross-
sectional heterogeneity, whereas residual variances that vary across countries
and regions are indeed likely to be a feature of our data set.7
One important issue in this context concerns the treatment of country-
specific fixed eﬀects or even trends in the data. As argued in Sørensen,
Yosha et al. (2004) panel regressions in which country-specific eﬀects are not
controlled for can be thought of as capturing some notion of long-run risk
7We explored an alternative possibility to account for cross-sectional heterogeneity: we
first estimated all regressions country by country and state by state. We then weighted
the data for each country with the standard deviation of the residuals and then redid the
panel analysis. The results did however not turn out to be substantially diﬀerent from our
earlier specifications and are therefore not reported here.
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sharing. In our setting, the level specification already is meant to capture
long-run risk sharing. Still, country heterogeneity can have an impact on how
much risk sharing we detect. As we have argued, the very notion of home
bias implies that country portfolios are heterogeneous. For example, relative
changes in asset prices can only aﬀect a country’s wealth in an asymmetric
way if the size or composition of the country’s portfolio is diﬀerent form that
of other countries. In this paper, we are interested in studying the impact of
this kind of heterogeneity on our measure of consumption risk sharing. We
therefore report our results with and without fixed eﬀects.
We present our results in table 1. Our findings carry a clear message:
For US federal states, we find a home bias of around 50 percent, almost
irrespective of whether we control for fixed eﬀects of not. In international
data, not controlling for fixed eﬀects, we detect a home bias between 85
and 90 percent in the 1960-90 period. For the later (i.e. the globalization)
period, estimates of (1 − λ) are just below 0.8. While this is considerably
lower than in the 1960-90 period, the diﬀerence does not generally appear
to be significant. However, once we control for country-heterogeneity by
removing fixed eﬀects, the increase in international risk sharing in the post-
1990 period comes out much more strongly: for the 1960-90 period we now
estimate (1− λ) to be between 0.96 and 0.98, whereas for the globalization
period the corresponding value is around 0.65(!). Note that the choice of
estimation method (OLS vs. PDOLS) has virtually no eﬀect on the results.
We interpret these findings as follows:
First, controlling for heterogeneity virtually does not matter for the amount
of risk sharing we find among U.S. federal states. But it does matter for the
size of the home bias detected among OECD countries and — in particular
— it seems to have a strong eﬀect on how strong the increase in risk sharing
during the globalization period is found to be. The increase in international
risk sharing that we document is in line with the evidence reported by re-
searchers who have examined international portfolio holdings directly (Lane
(2000), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001), Kraay et al. (2000)) and who report
a considerable increase in the net foreign asset positions of OECD countries
over the last two decades.
Secondly, the estimates in table 1 suggest that there is a lack of risk
sharing in international data in both subperiods, but even at the regional
level we find that U.S. citizens own a disproportionate share of the claims
to output of the federal state in which they live. This result provides a
perspective on the relative size of intra- and international home bias: by
measuring the eﬀective degree of financial integration, we take account of
those components of a nation’s or region’s output risk that are not traded
in financial markets: the equity of small firms or companies is most likely
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not traded across countries or regions nor are claims to the labour share
of national or regional outputs. Our estimates reflect this. Against this
background, even a modest estimate in table 1 of the increase in international
risk sharing in the 1990s — a drop of 1−λ from 0.9 to 0.8 when no country-fixed
eﬀects are controlled for — amounts to a dramatic increase in international risk
sharing: if our empirical measure of home bias among U.S. states (∼ 0.5)is
taken as a benchmark, then around 30 percent ((0.89− 0.77) / (0.9− 0.5) =
0.3) of the lack of international risk sharing (relative to regional risk sharing)
has vanished in the ten years after 1990 alone.
Some of the point estimates in panel a) are not significantly diﬀerent
between subperiods, while those in panel b) — the fixed eﬀect regressions —
generally are. This underscores our point that a more detailed modelling of
international diﬀerences in country-characteristics and their change over time
is likely to be important in order to gauge the impact of financial globaliza-
tion on consumption risk sharing. Our results below provide strong empirical
indications that a drop in 1− λ of between 0.1 and 0.2 is indeed the empir-
ically plausible order of magnitude for the increase in risk sharing. In a
separate subsection we also attempt to time the exact onset of this increase
in international diversification and we identify the late 1980s as the break-
point. Before we return to these issues, we use the Shiller portfolio weights
estimated in table 1 to generate income data.
4 Income flows and equity home bias
In this section, we examine to what extent we can use the model from sec-
tion two to replicate the dynamics of international income flows from the
estimated portfolio weights. We first demonstrate that the model — in spite
of its simplicity — does a very good job in characterizing income flows among
U.S. federal states. However, actual income flows fall short of predicted in-
come flows in international data.
4.1 Risk sharing and income flows
We use the estimates of the international portfolio weights λ to generate
income data according to
INCkt = λY
∗
t + (1− λ)Y kt (9)
using actual values of GDP for Y ∗ and Y k. In table 3 we present the
correlations between the actual and artificial income growth rates for the
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individual countries in the two subperiods. To save on space, we also present
the average correlation for U.S. federal states. For the average U.S. state
the correlation between actual and fitted income growth is 0.61, based on
an estimate of 1 − λ = 0.48. We note that we assumed that λ does not
vary across states. At the international level, the model performs better in
terms of income correlations, generating an average correlation of 0.71 in
the 1960-90 period and of well above 0.9 in 1990-2000.
To assess the relative volatility of actual and artificial income data, we
find it useful to employ the variance decomposition suggested by Asdrubali,
Sørensen and Yosha (1996). These were the first authors to explore em-
pirically to what extent consumption insurance is achieved through income
smoothing (ex-ante insurance) or rather through ex-post consumption smooth-
ing.8 While ASY report that more than 40 percent of relative income vari-
ability gets smoothed ex-ante in state level US data, Sørensen and Yosha
(1998) report that this channel is virtually inactive in international data.
The contribution of ex-post smoothing, is, however, comparable in both in-
ternational and national data. Can our artificial income data reproduce this
evidence? To assess this issue, we run regressions of the type suggested by
ASY (1996):
∆
£
ykt − y∗t
¤
−∆
£
inckt − inc∗t
¤
= βK∆
£
ykt − y∗t
¤
+ ut (10)
where ‘inc‘ denotes the logarithm of income constructed according to (2).
Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha refer to βK as a measure of the extent of risk
sharing through net factor income flows (income smoothing). In analogy,
the regression coeﬃcient βC in
∆
£
inckt − inc∗t
¤
−∆
£
ckt − c∗t
¤
= βC∆
£
ykt − y∗t
¤
+ vt (11)
measures the extent through which the sale and purchase of assets con-
tributes to risk sharing through consumption smoothing.
ASY also consider a fiscal transfer channel. There is no role for such a
channel on our simple theoretical setup. However, we note that most fiscal
transfers are not discretionary but based on rules or laws that have been set
ex-ante. We would therefore argue that fiscal transfers mainly provide ex
ante insurance through income smoothing .
We now estimate equations (10) and (11) based on our data sets, both the
artificial and the actual ones. Table (3) contains the results and juxtaposes
them to the findings obtained in ASY(1996) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998).
8Since we wil make frequent reference to this paper throughout this section, we will
refer to it under the acronym ‘ASY’.
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Our model does well in replicating the evidence on the relative importance
of income and consumption smoothing, in U.S. data. Our point estimates
for the artificial data are virtually the same as the ones obtained in ASY
(1996) (if one includes fiscal transfers in the income smoothing channel) and
Sørensen and Yosha (1998). Relative to our own estimates from the actual
data, the model somewhat underpredicts income smoothing and overpredicts
consumption smoothing. But we note that these deviations are benign rela-
tive to the overall extent of income risk sharing predicted by the model. They
are also very much in line with the estimates in the literature, in particular
with the ones obtained by ASY themselves.
In OECD data, however, the model does not allow us to generate GDP-
GNP diﬀerentials that can approximate the stylized fact identified by Sørensen
and Yosha and that is replicated in the table: the virtual shut-oﬀ of the in-
come smoothing channel in international data. Our estimates of risk sharing
through income flows based on artificial income data predict that about 13
percent of output risk are shared trough income smoothing in the 1960-90
period and even 24 percent during the globalization period.
But note that we detect an increase in income risk sharing during the
globalization period also in actual data, so that there seems to be an almost
constant gap of around 15 percent between the amount of income risk sharing
predicted by the model and the income risk sharing we find in the data.
We summarize our findings here as follows: in spite of its simplicity, our
model replicates salient features of income flows among U.S. federal states. It
also succeeds in rationalizing the increase in international risk sharing during
the globalization period: indeed, increases in international risk sharing during
the globalization period seem to be associated with increases in international
income flows. However, in particular in international data, our model would
somewhat overpredict the contribution of income flows to risk sharing in both
the 60-90 and the globalization periods.
We explore these issues in turn: in the next subsection, we provide ev-
idence based on recursive cross-sectional regressions to document that the
increase in consumption risk sharing is indeed associated with increases in in-
come flows. In final subsection we return to the role of country-heterogeneity
emphasized in the discussion surrounding table 1. Specifically, we explore
how heterogeneity in countries’ international portfolio positions opens an
additional channel for international risk sharing through capital gains and
valuation eﬀects. In this way, small net factor income flows for the aver-
age country can be reconciled with relatively high levels of consumption risk
sharing.
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4.2 The increase in international risk sharing and in-
come flows since 1980
We provide further evidence that the increase in international risk sharing
is associated with an increase in income flows. We run a sequence of cross-
sectional versions of our level risk sharing regression:
ckt − c∗t = (1− λt)
£
ykt − y∗t
¤
+ ukt
where (1− λ) now varies with time and t indexes years from 1980 to 2000.
This period covers the last ten years of our first subperiod as well as the
globalization period itself and we should therefore be able to pick up any
marked changes between periods.
To gauge how income risk sharing has increased over the same period, we
also run a sequence of cross-sectional regressions of the form£
ykt − y∗t
¤
−
£
inckt − inc∗t
¤
= γKt
£
ykt − y∗t
¤
+ ukt
This regression is almost the same as the ASY income smoothing re-
gression in (10) above, except that all variables are now expressed in levels.
Running this risk sharing regression in levels rather than in diﬀerences, avoids
a lot of cyclical variation in the coeﬃcient estimate. For example, Agronin
(2004) has shown that income risk sharing decreases in booms and increases
in recessions. Sørensen, Yosha et al. (2004) run cross-sectional income risk
sharing regressions in diﬀerences and have to smooth their estimates by tak-
ing moving averages to obtain plausible results. The levels-regression here
emphasizes longer-term risk sharing and we will therefore expect γKt to cap-
ture the trend of an increase in income risk sharing.
In figure (1), we plot OLS estimates of (1 − λt) and γKt. Our earlier
finding that consumption risk sharing has increased during the globalization
period finds a wholesale confirmation. The home bias measure (1−λt) starts
to decline around 1990, exactly at the same time as γKt starts to increase.
We note that the average of the coeﬃcients 1 − λt over the entire 1980-
2000 period is 0.83. The cross-sectional regressions reported here include a
constant, which accounts for the time-specific fixed eﬀect, but clearly there
is no way in which we could remove the country-specific mean in a pure
cross-sectional regression. The average of 0.83 will therefore correspond to
a panel regression in which country-specific means have not been controlled
for. Once we control for country-specifc eﬀects by removing country-means
for the entire 1980-2000 period before running the cross-sectional regressions,
the parameter values fluctuate around a mean of 0.67. This would seem to be
in keeping with the fixed eﬀect panel estimates reported in table 1, where we
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have found a value for 1− λ of 0.62. But note that removing the mean over
the entire sample period also removes the clear breakpoint around 1990 in
the sequence 1−λt. Rather, λt now appears unstable over the entire sample
period.
We draw two conclusions from this finding: first, the home bias has
started to decline in particular after 1990 and this decline amounts to an
increase in λt of around 0.1-0.15. At the same time, income risk sharing
has increased from virtually nil to around 8 percent, suggesting that the in-
crease in income risk sharing falls somewhat short of explaining the increase
in international risk sharing .
Secondly, in order to identify a precise starting point for the increase in
international risk sharing in our data set, we need to rely on estimates that
preserve country-heterogeneity by not removing country-specific fixed eﬀects.
This, in line with our results in table 1, suggests that country-heterogeneity
itself plays an important role in understanding risk sharing among countries
and in explaining why our model predicts income flows that are too big.
One important way in which heterogeneity in country characteristics
could play a role in helping countries to share consumption risk is through
diﬀerences in international asset positions. Note that the variance decom-
position of ASY implies that λt − γKt is equal to the coeﬃcient γCt in the
regression
[inckt − ckt]− [inc∗t − c∗t ] = γCt
£
ykt − y∗t
¤
+ ukt
where γCt constitutes a levels counterpart of the ex-post (consumption
smoothing) coeﬃcient βC above. Clearly, if increases in γKt do not oﬀset
the decline in λt, then γCt must have increased. However, note also that the
interpretation of γCt is slightly less straightforward than that of βC : while
βC measures consumption smoothing at the business cycle frequency, γCt
measures long run consumption smoothing. Therefore, a positive value for
γCt would suggest that variation in savings — as measured by the diﬀerence
between income and consumption — can help the average country in our
sample to avoid consumption variability in the long run. This can only
be the case if the average country has a buﬀer stock of foreign assets that
can generate capital gains (losses) that allow (require) the country to save
(dissave) in the long run.
But capital gains can only play a role in shielding relative consumption
levels from idiosyncratic fluctuations in output levels, if countries hold dif-
ferent portfolios of assets. Indeed, the substantial heterogeneity in country
portfolios, both in terms of the size of relative positions as well as in their
composition is now extensively documented in the literature (see the papers
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) also show that
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industrialized countries have realized very diﬀerent rates of return on their
international portfolios.
4.3 Heterogeneity in country portfolios
We therefore now relax the assumption that λ is the same across countries.
Our level risk sharing equation9 now becomes
ckt − c∗t = (1− λk)[ykt − y∗t ] + εkt (12)
We expect that portfolio heterogeneity can have an impact on λk along two
dimensions: first, countries with higher shares of foreign assets in their wealth
portfolio should enjoy more risk sharing. This mechanism has recently been
explored by Sørensen, Yosha et al. (2004). In this section we build on their
empirical framework.
Secondly, we expect the composition of a country’s portfolio to have a
bearing on how much risk sharing is eﬀectively achieved. Several recent
papers have emphasized the diﬀerential role of bonds and equities in the
international allocation of risk: Miller, Castrén and Zhang (2004) argue
that the early millenium stockmarket bust had only a modest eﬀect on U.S.
consumption mainly because the previous stock market boom was financed
through foreign equity inflows rather than through borrowing by U.S. in-
vestors. Becker and Hoﬀmann (2003) show that the lack of international risk
sharing is even more pronounced over longer horizons than it is at business
cycle frequencies. The main reason for this is that U.S. federal states gener-
ate income flows from equity cross-holdings which provide insurance against
permanent idiosyncratic fluctuations in output. Since most OECD countries
hold relatively little foreign equity, this channel appears much more muted
at the international level.
Even though the average degree of risk sharing through income flows
may (still) be low, we would still expect that countries that have engaged
strongly in international asset trade will be more successful in decoupling
their national incomes from their output. To capture the impact of foreign
assets and the composition of the country portfolio on our measure of home
bias, we postulate that λk is given by
1− λk = κ0(zk − z)
9It would seem that this level risk sharing equation could be estimated country by
country, very much as the levels risk sharing in the previous subsection But note that
unlike in (13) above, we are now dealing with non-stationary time series regressions which
would be spurious unless relative consumption is cointegrated with relative output. In our
data set, time series cointegration tests reject the null of no cointegration in only about
half of the 23 countries in our cross-section.
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where zk is a vector of country characteristics and z the vector of cross-
country means of zk. Plugging this relation into (12) then allows us to obtain
a panel regression from which the coeﬃcient vector κ can be estimated. Our
vector of country characteristics zk includes a measure two separate measure
of international asset cross-holdings,: the first, that we abbreviate with cat is
a measure of country k’s cumulative asset trade relative to its total financial
wealth. The second, called ceqtk is an indicator of the role of cumulated
equity trade, again relative to net wealth .10 We also control for the exchange
rate regime by including a dummy for those countries that were eventually
to become EMU members. Hence, we parametrize 1− λk as follows
1− λk = (1− λ) + κ1
¡
catk − cat
¢
+ κ2
¡
ceqtk − ceqt
¢
+ κ3(EMUk −EMU)
(13)
Here, EMUk is the EMU dummy variable and bars again denote the
mean across countries of the respective variable, so that in particular, (1− λ)
is the cross-sectional average of 1− λk.
We note that our international diversification measures are constructed to
emphasize the role of asset and in particular equity cross-holdings rather than
net positions. Also, unlike other studies, we normalize these cross-holdings
by the country’s entire wealth rather than by GDP. This is in keeping with
the interpretation of λ in our simple theoretical model: λ is the ex ante
share of a country’s or region’s entire wealth that is invested abroad, but it
is also the share of claims to its own output that the country sells to the
world mutual fund of Shiller securities. Therefore, in the model, claims to
domestic output are swapped for claims to rest-of-the-world output and the
ex ante net asset position is zero.11
To implement (12) and (13) , we obtain data on net foreign asset positions
from Kraay and Ventura (2000) and take the average over each country’s
asset positions over the respective subperiod.12 While richer data sets on
10Specifically, we construct cat as catk = Ak+LkWk and ceqt as ceqtk =
Aeqk +L
eq
k
Wk , where
Wk is country k net wealth, Ak and Lk are total gross foreign assets and gross liabilities
respectively and Aeqk and L
eq
k are gross foreign equity assets and liabilities.
11Our approach is can also justified based on Obstfeld’s (2004) recent argument that
cross-holdings, i.e. the sum of assets and liabilities measure the cumulated eﬀect of asset
trade on diversification, whereas net asset positions reflect intertemporal trade in assets.
He refers to the former as diversification asset trade and to the later as development asset
trade. Our interest here clearly is in diversification asset trade, so that we construct both
cat and ceqt as functions of cross-holdings.
12The Kraay and Ventura data set only stretches till 1997, and for the globalization
period we therefore take the mean over 1990-97 only. This is unlikely to aﬀect our results
since relative net foreign asset positions display a considerable degree of persistence.
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international asset positions are by now available (see in particular the data
set by Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Philip Lane (2001)), one advantage of
the Kraay and Ventura data set for our purposes here is that it also contains
estimates of countries’ domestic wealth, which in view of our discussion in the
previous paragraph is important for the normalization of the diversification
measures.
Again, we estimate the parameters in (13) for the two subperiods. Note
that we deliberately do not control for country-fixed eﬀects in this exercise.
It is through the cross-sectional variation in λ that we mean to capture the
heterogeneity that would otherwise show up in the country fixed eﬀects. Our
results, obtained by OLS, are given in table 4. Columns I and III give the
regression results based on the full set of regressors, i,.e. cat, ceqt, and
the EMU dummy. Note first that the estimated values for (1− λ) in both
subperiods are very close to the panel estimates for (1 − λ) obtained from
the fixed eﬀects panel regression in table 1, panel b. This is a very reassuring
outcome since it strongly suggests that our explicit modelling of the cross-
country- variation in λk properly captures the eﬀect of country heterogeneity
on our estimate of the home bias.
As is also apparent from these regressions, both the cumulative asset
trade variable, cat, as well as the EMU dummy are significant in the 1960-
90, pre-globalization period, while the trade in equity variable, ceqt, is not.
After 1990, however, only the equity trade measure is significant. We further
explore this result by restricting the regressions to include only those variables
that proved significant in columns I and III. These regressions, reported
in columns II and IV, strongly confirm the results from the unrestricted
regressions.
Note that in both sets of regressions, the significant variables have the
correct sign: countries with above average cumulative asset trade, and those
eventually to become EMU members tend to have lower home bias. The
same holds true during the globalization period, where countries with more
internationally diversified equity positions appear to display lower home bias.
But the three variables seem to have played diﬀerent roles in the diﬀerent sub-
periods. During the pre-globalization period, the composition of asset trade
(equity vs. debt) appears less important than it does in the more recent
period. Our interpretation is that in a world in which international diversifi-
cation is still low, countries are most likely to diﬀer significantly by the degree
to which they engage in asset trade at all. The same logic may help explain
the changing role of the EMU dummy: restrictions on international capital
flows and international cross-ownership of assets prevailed during most of the
period from 1960-90. In such an environment, the economic and financial in-
tegration that the prospective EMU members had already embarked on by
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the time is likely to have made a significant diﬀerence for the degree to which
those countries will have been able to share idiosyncratic risks. However, as
financial globalization has proceeded, making access to international finan-
cial markets and the control of overseas assets easier for all countries in our
sample, the role of EU and (eventual) EMU-membership in explaining the
cross-sectional heterogeneity in the data is likely to have declined.
During the 1990s, countries’ cumulative equity trade becomes the key
variable in explaining international diﬀerences in consumption risk sharing.
This result provides strong support for the conjecture by Sørensen, Yosha et
al. (2004) that risk sharing and equity home bias are in fact ‘twin puzzles
separated at birth’. Our results here add an important element to this
idea: while Sørensen, Yosha et al. show that countries with higher foreign
asset positions tend to achieve better risk sharing through income flows, our
results here emphasize the importance of equity cross-holdings in explaining
cross-country diﬀerences in the degree of long-run risk sharing.
As we have argued, however, the increase in international consumption
risk sharing that we have documented seems to exceed what can be explained
by increased international income flows alone. The very heterogeneity of
countries’ equity portfolios in itself could explain why the increase in income
flows seems to have remained quite moderate, possibly because valuation
eﬀects have allowed countries to insure against idiosyncratic risk. To explore
this possibility, we generate the values of (1− λk) implied by the restricted
regressions in table 4. Again, we then use the estimates of λk to generate
income flows according to
INCkt = (1− λk)Y ∗t + λkY kt
Table (5), panel a) displays the results of the ASY variance decomposi-
tion of output based on these income data. In both subperiods, the model
now explains the lack of international income flows: for the 1960-90 period,
we now obtain an estimate of βK, i.e. of income risk sharing of −0.01 almost
identical to the value obtained from actual data. For the 1990-2000 period
our estimate of βK now becomes 0.08, again virtually identical to that es-
timated from real data. The artificial income data continue to be highly
correlated with actual income growth: the last column provides the average
correlations between predicted and actual income growth rates. While the
average correlation between actual and generated income flow data is just
below 0.7 in the 1960-90 period, it is even higher after 1990, attaining a
value of 0.9.
Our point of departure for this subsection was that a simple model with
no cross-regional variation in λ replicates US inter-state with considerable
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precision, but that it predicts too much risk sharing through income flows at
the international level, in particular during the recent globalization period.
The exercise in this subsection has shown that controlling for diﬀerences in
the degree to which individual countries’ asset portfolios and in particular
their equity portfolios are diversified goes a considerable way in reconciling
observed international income flows with substantially increased levels of
eﬀective macroeconomic diversification (i.e. consumption risk sharing). We
turn to a further discussion of this result in our concluding section.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
A key finding of our paper is that the consumption risk among OECD coun-
tries has improved dramatically over the last decade. This finding is what one
should expect in world where the barriers to international capital flows have
virtually been removed and it ties in with the bulk of empirical evidence that
suggests that international cross-holdings of claims to capital have grown
considerably. Still, the literature so far has found it diﬃcult to document
that higher capital mobility actually does find its reflection in better inter-
national consumption risk sharing. Our framework, based on non-stationary
panel regressions, has allowed us to document that countries’ consumption
risks are indeed a lot more diversified now than they were in the past. This
improved risk sharing, does, however, seem to be rather a longer-term phe-
nomenon and that is why it is revealed by our level risk sharing regressions
and not by the standard diﬀerenced version.
Our estimates suggest that international consumption risk sharing has
increased considerably during the recent globalization period. There has
also been a marked increase the role of international income flows for risk
sharing among countries, but this increase falls short of explaining all of the
consumption risk sharing we see in international data. Rather, at the inter-
national level, consumption smoothing through saving and dissaving seems
important, even in response to permanent asymmetric output shocks. In the
long run, it would seem that this is only possible if countries systematically
realise capital gains as a way of insuring against output risk — a channel of
insurance that seems entirely absent in regional (U.S. state level) data.
The role of capital gains for the dynamics of international asset positions
has been emphasized in a number of influential recent studies, notably Lane
(2001), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) and Rey and Gourinchas (2004).
One precondition for such valuation eﬀects to work as a channel that allows
countries to share idiosyncratic consumption risk is that country portfolios
must be heterogenous. Clearly, the very notion of portfolio home bias means
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that countries’ portfolios are heterogeneous. But even as the share of foreign
assets in most countries’ portfolios is increasing, substantial heterogeneity in
terms of the composition of country portfolios persists in the data.13
We therefore examine to what extent heterogeneity in country portfo-
lios can account for our finding that only a relatively modest share of total
consumption insurance actually takes place through capital income flows.
Our results confirm the intuition that countries with more diversified inter-
national asset — and in particular equity — positions generally enjoy better
consumption risk sharing through larger capital income flows. But they also
suggest that the heterogeneity in country portfolios has played an important
role in keeping international capital income flows at a relatively modest level
for the average country. Taken together, these results support the notion
that valuation eﬀects also play an important role in explaining the recent
increase in international consumption risk sharing.
One interesting question that arises from these findings is why such valua-
tion eﬀects seem important for consumption risk sharing at the international
level, while cross-regional income flows are the main channel of risk sharing
between U.S. federal states. One potential explanation is that exchange rate
adjustments can be an important source of valuation eﬀects and thus, at least
to the extent that they act as shock absorbers, a channel of consumption in-
surance. This would allow countries to substitute exchange rate flexibility for
better international portfolio diversification. We leave this issue for future
research.
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Table 1: Estimates of the home bias (1− λ)
Panel a: Regressions without fixed eﬀects
(ckt − c∗t ) = const+ (1− λ)(ykt − y∗t ) + ukt
United States OECD
(1960-90) 1960-90 1990-2000
OLS 0.48 (0.01) 0.89 (0.01) 0.78 (0.02)
Panel Dynamic OLS 0.52 (0.08) 0.87 (0.09) 0.80 (0.19)
Panel b: Regressions controlling for fixed eﬀects
(ckt − c∗t ) = const+ φk + (1− λ)(ykt − y∗t ) + ukt
United States OECD
(1960-90) 1960-90 1990-2000
OLS 0.50 (0.02) 0.96 (0.02) 0.62 (0.06)
Panel Dynamic OLS 0.48 (0.13) 0.98 (0.23) 0.65 (0.19)
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NOTES: The results reported for the panel dynamic OLS estimation are based on estimating equations
of the form ckt − c∗kt = d(1− λ)xkt + Ppl=−p δkl∆xt−l + vkt where xkt = (ykt −
y∗kt). Standard errors are given in parentheses. Those for the PDOLS estimates are corrected for serial
correlation in ∆x and for its endogneity based on the results in Kao and Chiang (1999). The reported
OLS standard erros are valid only for a stationary regression. Since the OLS and the PDOLS have the
same asymptotic variance, the corresponding standard errors for the OLS-procedure if c − c∗ and x
are non-stationary are the same as those provided for the PDOLS estimates. Constant estimates are not
reported.
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Table 2
Correlations between fitted and actual income growth
Country 1960-90 1990-2000
Canada –— 0.98
USA 0.69 0.96
Japan 0.72 0.99
Austria 0.60 0.89
Belgium 0.56 0.77
Denmark –— 0.91
Finland 0.73 0.99
France 0.61 0.95
Germany –— 0.99
Greece 0.79 0.97
Iceland 0.90 0.99
Ireland 0.84 0.86
Italy 0.72 0.92
Luxemburg 0.65 0.71
Netherlands 0.64 0.68
Norway 0.83 0.96
Portugal 0.76 0.98
Spain 0.77 0.99
Sweden 0.72 0.97
Switzerland 0.74 0.82
United Kingdom –— 0.91
Australia 0.78 0.98
New Zealand –— 0.89
OECD average 0.73 0.92
US state average 0.61 –
fitted data generated with the portfolio shares estimated from the
OLS regression with plain levels and without fixed eﬀects. (table 1)
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Table 3: Ex-ante and ex-post risk sharing in fitted and actual GNP data
United States OECD
1960-90 1990-2000
1− λ = 0.48 1− λ = 0.89 1− λ = 0.78
Data ex-ante ex-post ex-ante ex-post ex-ante ex-post
fitted 0.47 0.36 0.13 0.09 0.24 -0.03
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.12)
actual 0.58 0.25 -0.01 0.23 0.08 0.13
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.12)
ASY (1996) SY98 (1960-90)
Literature 0.52 0.30 0.03 0.25 – –
NOTES: regression coeﬃcients from equations (10) (ex-ante) and (11) (ex post), based on actual and
artificial (’fitted’) data. Fitted data generated according to equation (2) with the portfolio shares λ given
at the top of the column. Regressions without country-specific fixed eﬀects.
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Table 4
impact of foreign portfolio holdings on risk sharing
OECD countries
1960-90 1990-2000
I II III IV
1− λ 0.93 0.93 0.70 0.70
(63.84) (64.83) (20.77) (22.99)
cat -0.53 -0.41 -0.1275
(-4.71) (-5.80) (-0.8736)
ceqt 0.79 -2.0201 -2.15
(1.37) (-2.67) (-4.27)
EMU -0.22 -0.25 -0.1026
(-5.08) (-7.15) (-1.53)
Notes: coeﬃcients estimated by OLS from eqs. 13 and 12. t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 5: Ex-ante and ex-post risk sharing with portfolio heterogeneity
Regression OECD
1960-90 1990-2000
Data ex-ante ex-post ρ ex-ante ex-post ρ
fitted -0.01 0.23 0.69 0.08 0.14 0.90
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.11)
actual -0.01 0.23 –– 0.08 0.13 –—
(0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.12)
NOTES: the fitted data were generated based on the values for λk implied by the representation
1− λk = κ0(zk−z), where the coeﬃcients from the restricted models (columns II and IV) in table
4 have been used for the respective subperiod. The columns headed ’ρ’ give the mean (across countries)
of the correlation between actual and fitted (relative) income growth data.
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Figure 1: The increase in consumption risk sharing 1980-2000.
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